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JOINT TENANCY AND TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
FOUR UNITIES REQUIREMENT
Two recent decisions' have taken steps toward eliminatinr
the four unities requirement for creation of joint estates and
estates by the entirety, and make worth-while a re-examination
of the conflicting interests and principles involved in tlis
question, heretofore productive of much difference of opin-
ion.2 The situation most often before the courts, and the one
with which this discussion is concerned, is that in which a
present owner of real property executes a conveyance of such
property to himself and his spouse, either as joint tenants or
as tenants by the entirety
Often both spouses are joined as grantors, (1) wben the
husband is owner, to release the wife's inchoate dower right.
and (2) when the wife is owner, (a) to release the husband's
curtesy3 or (b) to -atisfy the requirement that a husband
must join in his -wife's deed to render it effective. In many
states these considerations do not arise, and it is submitted
that it is unnecessary for both b]usband and wife to execute a
deed as grantors.
The four unities concept is an anachronism of the feudal
common-law,4 and is explained by Blackstone in the following
language
"1. The creation of an estate i joint-tenancy de-
pends on the wording of the deed or the devise, by
winch the tenants claim title; for this estate can only
arise by purchase or grant, that is, by the act of the
parties, and never by mere act of law. Now, if an estate
be given to a plurality of persons, without adding any
restrictive, exclusive, or explanatory words, as if an es-
tate be granted to A and B and their heirs, tins makes
'Switzer v. Pratt, -Iowa- 23 N.W 2d 837 (1946) Therrien
v. Therrien, -N. H.-, 45 A. 2d 538 (1946).
'Johnson v Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939), Stuehm
v Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W..595 (1941) In re Klatzl's Es-
tate, 216 N.Y. 83, 110 N.E. 181 (1915).
-Cf. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 503, 561.
'See Tyler v U.S., 281 U.S. 497, 74 L. ed. 991, 50 S. Ct. 356(1930), Switzer v. Pratt, -Iowa-, 23 N.W 2d 837 (1946), Hiles v.
Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895) Madden v. Gosztonyi Sav-
ings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 Atl. 624 (1937).
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immediate joint-tenants in fee of the lands. For the law
interprets the grant so as to make all parts of it' take
effect, which can only be done by creating an equal
estate in them both. As therefore the grantor has thus
united their names, the law gives them a thorough
union in all respects. For,
"2. The properties of a joint estate are derived
from its unity, which is four fold; the unity of snterest,
the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity of
possesston: or, in other words, joint-tenants have one
and the same interest, accruing by one and the same
conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and
held by one and the same undivided possession."'
This concept of the four unities has existed unchanged
since the 17th century, and is still a yalid requirement for the
creation of joint estates in a majority of jurisdictions.6
An estate by the entirety is merely an adaptation of the
joint estate to a holding by a marital unity 7 The principal
incident of joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety is sur
vivorslnp.8 Upon the death of one joint tenant his share vests
in the survivor or survivors until there be but one survivor,
then the estate becomes one in severalty to hn and descends
to his heirs upon his death..9 Such estates may be created in
fee, for life, or years, or even in remainder. The survivorship
of joint tenancy is a succession to the whole estate by the right
of su-vivorship, the survivorship incident to an estate by the
entirety is the contnvatwn of the wbile estate in the
survivor.
1 0
A tenancy by the entireties may exist only if the owners
are husband and wife, thus, in addition to the four unities,
embodying what has been called unity of person." Husband
and wife are each seized of the entire estate per tout et von
per my, each owning not an undivided part, but the whole
G 2 BL. COMM. *180.
6Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W 595 (1941) 2
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 418.
12 TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 430; see U. S. v
Jacobs, &c., 306 U.S. 363, 83 L. ed. 763, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939)8 Ibzd.
"See Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 34 N.E. 999 (1893).
"Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo. 353, 201 S.W 72 (1918), Alles
v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 Atl. 81 (1907)
"Carlisle v. Parker, 188 Atl. 67 (Del. 1936) Johnson v. Lande-
feld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939), Hoyt v. Winstanley, 221 Mich.




estate, as contrasted with a holding per tout et per my by joint
tenants.12 A tenancy by the entireties is a joint tenancy,
modified by the common-law concept of husband-and wife as
one.' 3 The characteristic which distinguishes tenancy by the
entirety from joint tenancy is the former's inseverability by
individual act of either the husband or wife. Neither can dis-
pose of nor dissolve any part of the estate without the consent
of the other.' 4 Upon the death of either the husband or the
wife, the other takes free of any charges on the estate made
by the deceased spouse.' 5
It is apparent upon cursory examination that a convey-
ance from husband to husband and wife for the express pur
pose of creating either a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the
entirety fails to satisfy the unities requirement for either of
these estates. Unity of time and unity of title are lackng117
'When a husband purports to convey an estate in joint teu-
ancy to husband and wife it will be seen that the time of vest-
ing of the husband's interest and the source of his title each
differ. from the time and source of his wife's interest. If such
a conveyance purports to create a tenancy by the entirety the
unities of time and title are likewise absent unless we so alter
the common-law concepts as to permit viewing the marital
entity as being, entirely separate and distinct from its two
component parts, in which case in one and the same uintru-
'Thornburg v Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 34 N.E. 999 (1893) Mes-
senbaugh v Goll, 198 Mo. App. 698, 202 S.W 265 (1918), Alles v.
Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 AtI. 81 (1907).
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 430.14 Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 34 N.E. 999 (1893). Fay v.
Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W 369 (1926), Hoffman v Newell,
249 Ky 270, 60 S.W 2d 607 (1932), Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo.
353, 201 S.W 72 (1918), Lopez v McQuade, 151 Misc. 390, 273 N.Y.
Supp. 34 (1934), Green v Cannadyr 77 S.C. 193, 57 S.E. 832 (1907)
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 430.
" Hoffman v Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W 2d 607 (1932) Petty
v. Petty, 220 Ky. 569, 295 S.W 863 (1927), Lang v. Wilmer, 131 Md.
215, 101 Atl. 706 (1917)
"
6Deslauriers v Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928),.Stone
v Culver, 286 Mich. 263, 282 N.W 142 (1938) Umon Guardian Trust
Co. v Vogt, 263 Mich. 330, 248 N.W 639 (1933), Pegg v. Pegg, 165
Mich. 228, 130 N.W 617 (1911), Stuehm v Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374,
297 N.W 595 (1941), Dressler v. Mulhern, 77 Misc. 476, 136 N.Y.
Supp. 1049 (1912) American Nat'l. Bank v. Taylor, 112 Va. 1, 70
S.E. 534 (1911)- Breitenbach v Shoen, 183 Wisc. 589, 198 N.W 622
(1924).
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ment the grantor is conceived as acting in his sole capacity and
simultaneously as an indivisible part of the entity This many
courts have refused to do.17
In addition to the requirements that the unities be satis-
fied, there are other obstacles to creation of joint estates and
estates by the entirety at common-law. First, one may not be
both grantor and grantee in the same deed.i s Second, a hus-
band can not convey to his wife nor she to him, !he having no
legal personalty apart from his. 19 Although the latter objec-
tion has generally been obviated today by statute,20 the former
is still an obstacle in many states.2 ' Although statutes bearing
on the former obstacle are infrequent the tendency of the
courts today is to ignore this difficulty 22 Some jurisdictions
have expressly denied that it has any validity in present day
law. 23
Creation of joint estates and estates by the entirely has
become increasingly prevalent during the past few years and
"Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 IIl. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928) Ames
v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N.E. 616 (1929), Pegg v. Pegg, 165
Mich. 228, 130 N.W 617 (191-1), In Te Walker's Estate, 340 Pa. 13,
16 A. 2d 28 (1940), Madden v Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331
Pa. 476, 200 Ati. 624 (1937).
fDeslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928) Scar-
borough v. Watkms, et ux, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 540 (1849), Wright
v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 150 N.W 315 (1915) Dutton v. Buckley,
116 Ore. 661, 242 Pac. 626 (1926) Green v. Cannady, 77 S.C. 193, 57
S.E. 832 (1907) Cameron v. Steves, 9 N.B. 141 (1858) 1 SHEP.
ToucH. *82.
"
9 McCord v. Bright, 44 Ind. App. 275, 87 N.E. 654 (1909), Vicroy
v. Vicroy, 45 S.W 75, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 47 (1898), Sayers v. Coleman,
5 Ky. Opin. 733 (1871).
' Ky. R. S. Ch. 404, and similar married women's acts in alljurisdictions.
'Johnson v Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939)
Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928) Wright v.
Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 150 N.W 315 (1915) Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139
Neb. 374, 297 N.W 595 (1941), Green v Cannady, 77 S. C. 193, 57
S.E. 832 (1907), Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S.W 1044(1924), Breitenbach v Shoen, 183 Wisc. 589, 198 N.W 622 (1924).
--Irvme v. Helvering, 99 F 2d 265 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938) Edmonds
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F 2d 14 (C.C.A. 9th 1937),
cert. dened 302 U.S. 713, 82 L. ed. 551, 58 S. Ct. 32 (1937), Cadgene
v. Cadgene, 17 N.J. Misc. 332, 8 A. 2d 858 (1939), affd 124 N.J.
Law 566, 12 A. 2d 635 (1940), In re Horlers Estate, 168 N.Y. Supp.
221 (1917), Colson v. Baker, 42 N.Y. Misc. 407, 87 N.Y. Supp. 238
(1904).
'Switzer v. PrAtt, -Iowa- 23 N.W 2d 837 (1946), Fay v
Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W 369 (1926).
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there is reason to believe thi tendency will continue.24 The
question of how such estates may properly be created is inghly
pertinent. In the majority opinion of Stuehm v. lfikidski 25
it is stated that counsel's brief alleges that an investigation
has dis.loaed fifty-five such deeds (i.e. by husband to husband
and wife as joint tenants or as tenants by the entirety) have
been placed on record in Dodge County, Nebraska, since 1926,
which interval covers approximately seventeen years. It is
known that a number of sucb. instruments have of late years
been placed to record in Fayette County, Kentucky, the home
of the writer, although Kentucky has not yet had such an in-
strument before its highest court. Can it be doubted that this
is a matter the ultimate determination of wnch is of first in-
portance for the purpose of stabilizing titles and avoiding
needless litigation 9
We now come to a consideration of the various cour,2s of
conduct open to our courts. -The first course of conduct that
suggests itself is adherence to the strict principles and re-
quirements of common-law. Tins is to require the satisfaction
of all the unities and in many jurisdictions satify the objec-
tion that one may not convey to hinself. The general practice
for complying with these common-law requirements is for the
owner of property to convey to a trustee who immediately re-
conveys to the two spouses.26 For the law to require such cir-
cuitous conveyancmg to satisy requirements winch have no
apparent substantive value is to aid and abet the layman's
criticism of the profession as engaging in purposeful obfusca-
tion for the sole purpose of making the law incomprehensible
to those unschooled in it, and cannot be justified unless real
substantive value can be shown. Any argument which can be
stated in support of the premise that the four unities rule
sbhould be retained may be rebutted by the layman's answer
that the same result may be reached by the meaningless fetish
of conveying through a trustee.
Certainly, the circumstances winch gave birth during
Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W 595 (1941).
Ibzd.
'See Therrien v. Therrien, -N.H.-, 46 A. 2d 538 (1946), Dut-
ton v. Buckley, 116 Ore. 661, 242 Pac. 626 (1926).
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feudal times to these requirements no longer apply During
the 17th century the common-law of England favored -main-
taming estates unbroken. Joint estates and estates by entire-
ties were widely used. The four unities required is merely one
ianifestation of the attitude winch gave rise to all the rules
of prnnogeniture. The symmetry and simplicity of application
of the four unities rule, which no doubt appealed strongly to
the medieval mind, is little justification for continuing its ap-
plication today 27
In addition to considering the fact that these feudal rules
of property law have no place in modern simplified conveyanc-
iug, it is instructive to note the results reached by thov courts
winch have followed common-law. Generally these courts have
held that a conveyance by one spouse to the two creates a
tenancy in common.28 This result seems to have been reached
Dy sa.ing that since the unities of time and title are lacking
the attempt to create a joint estate or an estate by entireties
has failed,2 9 and the closest approximation which the court
can give is tenancy in common. It is generally said that the
rule against conveying to oneself is not breached, but that an
interest in the property is retained by the grantor.3 0 It is dif-
ficult to harmoize this conclusion with the fact the instru-
ment purports to convey the entire estate.
Following strictly the common-law rules of construction,
other courts have held that a conveyance from one person to
himself and another vests the entire fee in that other,:"
reasoning that since the instrument purports to convey the
entire fee and one can not take under his or her own deed, the
effect is to vest the title in that grantee who I- capable of tak-
CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1911) 367.
sDeslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928), Fay
v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W 369 (1926) Stone v. Culver, 286
Mich. 263, 282 N.W 142 (1938), Green v. Cannady, 77 S.C. 193, 57
S.E. 832 (1907), 137 A. L. R. 348.
-'Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928), Stone
v. Culver, 286 Mich. 263, 282 N.W 142 (1938).
1 Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939) (dissent-
mg opinion), Deslauriers v Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928)
Wright v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 150 N.W 315 (1915) (dissenting
opinion), Green v. Cannady, 77 S.C. 193, 57 S.E. 832 (1907).
:Wright v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 150 N.W 315 (1915) icks
v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S.W 1044 (1924), Cameron v. Steves,
9 N.B. 141 (1858).
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ag. Certainly this follows common-law rules of construction, 2
but does violence to the purpose of tbe parties.
Still other courts have followed a course winch seems to
result in the creation of new types of estates in real property
In Dutton v Buckley33 the court held that a conveyance of
the husband's property by husband and wife to themselves,
as tenants by the entirety gave the wife one-half in fee with
remainder in the other one-half. Often the courts have said
that since the deed specifies that the grantor shall hold with
the incident of Purvivorship it matters not whether the estate
be a joint estate, estate by entirety, or some other estate, effect
will be given to the provision for survivorstnp.3 4 Tins seems
to have been the view of the Kentucky court in McKee v
MarshaZI35 where a deed from husband to wife, "survivor to
himself," was said to vest the absolute estate in the stuivor,
the husband in thjs case. The court said that in creating the
estate for the benefit of the wife, the husband provided that
the land survive to him in the event he outlived her. No men-
tion is made of the four unities or of other common-law ob-
stacles, nor does the court give its opinion a. to what estate
the parties enjoyed during their joint lives, merely saying
that there was created such an estate as vested an absolute
estate in the one surviving. Examination of the authorities
fails to show that this case has ever been cited.3 6
Maryland has held that where husband and wife hold as
tenants in common the right of survivorship may attach
thereto.3  New York seems to have agreed, s although the
weight of authority is clearly contra.30
For the past 300 years it has been the policy of the courts
31 SnEP. TOUCH. '82.
116 Ore. 661, 242 Pac. 626 (1926)
Ibid.
9 Ky. L. Rep. 461, 5 S.W 415 (1887)
Shepard's Ky Citator.
"' Mitchell v Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 170 Atl. 733 (1934) Cf. In re
Brown (1932) 60 F 2d 269.
'Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895), cf. McGhee
v. Henry 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W 509 (1921).
"Pegg v. Pegg, 165 Mich. 228, 130 N.W 617 (1911) I-. re
Walker's Estate, 340 Pa. 13, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940), Weber v. Nedin, 210
Wisc. 39, 242 N.W 487 (1930), see Weber v. Nedin, 210 Wisc. 39,
246 N.W 307 (1933).
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to avoid the creation of new types of estates in real property
It has been felt that those estates recognized by the early
common-law were more than sufficient to meet the various re-
quirements of property owners, and that to permit, other than
by statute, any new forms of estates would merely serve to
complicate property law and to introduce confusion as to
rights, uncertainty as to title, and useless and expensive
litigation.40
It has been suggested that the proper course of conduct
for courts today, with reference to the construction of such
deeds, is to await legislative action.4 1 The objection to this
policy is that reliance on it for many years has failed to be
productive of widespread statutory reform, and it is to be
doubted whether in the absence of organized effort the ques-
tion will get the attention of the various state legislatures.
The statutory presumption against joint tenancy and tenancy
by the entirety in deeds to more than one person which do not
specify the estate created 42 Is opposed to the common-law rule
which favored the creation of estates carrying the incident of
survivorship, and which assumed such an estate was intended
unless a contrary intent was indicated. The present rule re-
duces the number of such estates, and thus the frequency with
which such cases arise. Today, th.e problem is lacking in politi-
cal significance, few persons are directly concerned, and it is
not of a nature to be viewed as pressing by legislatures. Nor
can it be said that statutes always solve the problem. In Ames
v Chandler43 the court points out that the M1assachusetts
statute.44 although helpful as far as joint tenancies are con-
cerned, leaves the problem unsolved as to estates by the
entirety
" CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1911) p. 59 et seq., Stuehm v
Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W 595 (1941).4 Note (1932) 18 CORN. L. Q. 284.
12 Conlee v. Conlee, 222 Iowa 561, 269 N.W 259 (1936) Ky. R. S.
381.050.
'"265 Mass. 428, 164 N.E. 616 (1929), cf. Edge v Barrow, 316
Mass. 104, 55 N.E. 2d 5 (1944).
4"Real estate, including any interest therein, may be trans-
ferred by a person to himself jointly with another person in the
same manner in which it might be transferred by him to another
person." MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 184, sec. 8.
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The American Law Institute's Property Act 45 was drawn
in 1936, but has not been adopted by any jurisdiction other
than Nebraska to date. According to its prefactory note,
"The act is drawn primarily to abolish anachron-
isms in the law of property, to abolish many out-of-
date characteristics which have come down to us from
the early feudal law of England, and which are out of
place in the law of today and also to correct many
characteristics which have crept into the law from
improper application of the early law and which can
be got rid of today only by statutory enactment."
This statement might well have been directed specifically at
the rules which provide the subject matter for this note.
Immediately after the Steuhm case the Nebraska legisla-
ture became the first state to adopt the Uniform Property
Act. 46 In. adopting this act Nebraska eliminated so much of
see. 18 as pertained to tenancy by the entirety, but retained
that portion which permits conveyancing to oneself and the
creation of joint tenancy by deed from husband to husband
and wife. 7 It is the writer's belief that this indicated the
purpose of the legislature to discourage the creation of ten-
ancies by the entirety and to simplify the creation of joint
tenancies, whether by husband and wife or other parties.
Actually, as to estates by the entirety, it leaves the law in a
more chaotic condition than before.
The Model Interparty Agreement Act, which has been
adopted by four states,4 8 permits conveyancing to oneself and
another, or others. This statute has been interpreted by
Pennsylvania m In re Vandergrift's Estate49 as permittig
creation of a joint estate by deed by wife to husband and wife,
without any discussion of the four unities. However, In re
Walker's Estate50 the court refused to apply the rule of the
Vandergrift case to the creation of an estate by the entireties
where there was no joint deed. Following this decision Penn-
svlvania in 1941 amended the Model Interparty Agreement
9 UNTIFORnm LAWS _ANN. (1942) 611.
Ibid.
COMP. STAT. NEB. (Supp. 1941) 76-1018.
M d., Nev., Pa., Utah. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (1942) 425, Supp.
(1946) 122.
PA. STAT. ANN, (Purdon, 1936) t. 69, sec. 541, In re Vander-
grift's Estate, 105 Pa. Sup. 293, 161 Atl. 898 (1932)
u"340 Pa. 13, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940).
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Act to direct that the statute be construed as " authoriz-
ing a conveyance of an interest in real property by either hus-
band or wife to husband and wife as tenants by the
entireties. " 51
As originally drawn tns statute seems to be subject to the
same shortcoming, with reference to estates by the entirety, as is
the Massachusetts statute, supra..5 2
Under statutes authorizing a conveyance by one person to
hinself jointly with another5 3 and authorizing a married woman
to take a conveyance directly from her husband,5 4 Rhode Island
has held that a deed by a husband to nifaself and ins wife is ef-
fective to create a joint tenancy, with survivorship, such inten-
tion being expressed in the instrument.5 5 _
But in a recent case Wiconsm has held that a statute56
directing that "Any deed to two or more grantees'winch
eunces an intent to create a joint tenancy in grantees shall
be held and construed to. create such joint tenancy" does not
apply where the deed runs to the grantor and another, with in-
tention to create a joint tenancy clearly expressed.5 7
Although overruling centuries of stare decists has been ob-
jected to as creating an uncertainty in property law, and as
having a retroactive effect,5s these objections lose their force
when it is observed that the present uncertainty in regard to
methods of creating joint estates and estates by the entirety has
been spawned by the incomprehensibility and illogical qualities
of the applicable common-law rule. As to retroactive operation
of judicial decisions in tins field, it is patent that the only result
can be to give effect to the purpose of the parties, and such
decisions cannot result in defeating any purpose carried inLo
execution through reliance on the common-law. Whatever other
objections may be made are answerable by the rejoinder that
the same result may be reached by conveying through a tinrd
"PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) t. 69, sec. 541.
2 -In re Walker's Estate, 340 Pa. 13, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940)
IR. L GEN. LAWS (1923) c. 297, sec. 20.
"R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) c. 290, sec. 4.
'Lawton v. Lawton, 48 R. I. 134, 136 Atl. 241 (1927)
"Wisc. STAT. (1943) sec. 230.45 (3).7Hass v. Hass, 248 Wisc. 212, 21 N.W 2d 398 (1946)
Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W 595, 598 (1941),
Note (1932) 18 CoRN. L. Q. 284.
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person. It is to be noted that several courts have refused to
permit common-law concepts of property tenure to interfere -with
the application of death transfer taxes.59 Where property was
held by the entirety, the IUIited States Supreme Court has
unanimously declined to permit an "amiable fiction of the
common-law" to interfere with the collection of the federal
estate tax.60 It is believed that under present day taxing con-
cepts all states would follow tins decision. It is, of course.
based on taxation law and not on real property law
Several courts have taken the course of ignoring or so warp-
ing the common-law concepts of the unities as to give effect to
the intention of the parties in a deed to oneself and another,
attempting to create-a joint estate or an estate by the enirety
New York has taken the lead in this respect.61 The New York
cases have not considered the inability of one person to be both
grantor and grantee in the same deed, but appear to have based
their holdings on the statute vesting -m husband and wife the
ability to contract with each other. 2 New Jersey has followed
New York's lead.0 3 These cases temporarily place the law in a
state of flux by failing to define the issues and face them di-
rectly, thus introducing confusion and uncertainty until such
time as enough cases have been adjudicated to clarify the posi-
tion of the court.
Some courts have urged that the proper method of dispens-
ing with the four unities requirement is by application of the
rule that instruments are to be construed according to intention
"ITyler v. U.S., 281 U.S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 356, 74 L, ed. 991 (1930)
Matter of Farrand's Estate, 214 N.Y. Supp. 793 (1926) In re
Klatzl's Estate, 216 N.Y. 83, 110 N.E. 181 (1915), In re Walker's Es-
tate, 340 Pa. 13, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940), Note, 69 A.L.R. 766.
Tyler v U.S., 281 U.S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 356, 74 L. ed. 991 (1930)
Boehrmger v. Schmid, 254 N.Y. 355, 173 N.E. 220 (1930) In re
Vogelsang, 203 N.Y. Supp. 364 (1924), In re Horlers Estate, 168
N.Y. Supp. 221 (1917), accord Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511,
189 So. 666 (1939), Conlee v. Conlee, 222 Iowa 561, 269 N.W 259
(1936) Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, 149 N.W 613 (1914) Cadgene
v. Cadgene, 17 N.J. Misc. 332, 8 A. 2d 858 (1939), aff'd 124 N.J. Law
566, 12 A. 2d 635 (1940), Brown v Jackson, 35 N.M. 604, 4 P 2d
1081 (1931) McRoberts v. Copland, 85 Tenn. 211, 2 S.W 33 (1886).
'N.Y. Domestic Relations Laws (Thompson, 1939), sec. 56; In re
Klatzl's Estate, 216 N.Y. 83, 110 N.E. 181 (1915).
0 Cadgene v. Cadgene, 17 N.J. Misc. 332, 8 A. 2d 858 (1939),
aff1d 124 N.J. Law 566, 12 A. 2d 635 (1940).
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of the parties thereto.0 4 It is submitted that this viewpoint is
prenused on the error of viewing the four unities requirement
as a rule of construction, whereas actually it is a rule of sub-
stantive law.0 5
Granting that the modern tendency is to disregard techi-
calities of construction and to treat uncertainties in a conveyance
as ambiguities subject to clarification by resort to the intention
of the parties, 0 nevertheless a settled rule of property which
fixes a special meaning upon particular words employed in a
deed determines the legal effect of such language. Such rules of
property are applied automatically as a resultant of the words
used and no speculation as to intent of the parties in using such
words will be indulged in by the court. 67 As illustration, the
words "and ns heirs" will always be held to have effect ac-
cording to the rule of Shelley's case, regardless of what may have
been the intention of the parties. These words will always desig-
nate a fee simple even though the parties may have believed
they indicated an entailed estate. 68 The unities requirement for
creation of joint estates and estates by entirety falls in the same
category as Shelly's rule, namely a rule of property and not a
rule of construction. 0 Therefore, however much we may desire
to do away with the unities requirement, it is error to predicate
this change in the law on the statute or decision authorizing the
court to give effect to the intent of the parties as a matter of
construction.
Rather, in view of the waning prestige of conceptualism in
resolving current legal problems and the general practice of
looking to substance rather than form, it is believed that the
courts might easily find that the unities have no place in modern
'Lang v. Wilmer, 131 Md. 215, 101 Atl. 706 (1917) Bassett v.
Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 43 N.W 984 (1889) Stuehm v Mikulskl, 139
Neb. 374, 297 N.W 595, 603 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
'Kunz v Kurtz, 8 Del. Ch. 404, 68 Atl. 450 (1899), Robinson's
Appeal, 88 Me. 17, 33 Atl. 652 (1895) Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb.
374, 297 N.W 595 (1941).
"Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 82 S.W 998 (1904)
Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N.W 327 (1928) 2
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 349.
Berry v. Williamson, 50 Ky. (11 B. Mon.) 245, 257 (1850) 2
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 344. (Tins rule is gener-
ally abolished by statute today. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, (3d ed.
1939) sec. 355)
'Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W 595 (1941).
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law. This construction is aided by keeping in mind that most of
our states in adopting the commonlaw of England or of older
states qualified such adoption to apply only to so much of that
law as was applicable to their circumstances and times.7 0 In this
connection it is worth recalling the approach of the courts to
the problem of applying estate taxes to estates held by the en-
tirety upon the death of the shorter lived spouse.7 1
The two recent decisions referred to above are Therrien v
Therrten72 and Switzer v Pratt,73 both decided in 1946. In the
former a wife conveyed to herself and her husband as joint
tenants, with survivorship. In expressly denying the efficacy of
the unities rule to defeat their stated purpose the court said that
the interest created is that which the parties intended to create,
without regard to rules surviving from feudal times. The court
further said that "Neither public policy, statutes or reason
prevent the parties from doing directly that which they may
accomplish through a straw man indirectly," and quoted with
approval from Holmes, "It is revolting to have no better reason
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down m the time of
Henry IV It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past." 7 4
In Switzer v. Pratt the Iowa court in an exhaustive opinion,
reviewing the authorities, likewise expressly rejected the validity
of the four unities requirement and refused to be bound by
concepts whose sole virtue lay in their antiquity
In this case the husband owned property which he, joined
by his wife, conveyed to himself and ins wife as joint tenants,
with survivorship. He met ins death in France in the armed
forces, and the widow sought specific performance by the de-
fendant of a subsequent contract to purchase the property, de-
fendant resisting on the ground that the instrument was not
"Morris v. Fraker, 5 Colo. 425 (1880), Wagner v. Bissell, 3
Iowa (Cole's ed.) 396 (1856) cf. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 43 S.
Ct. 16, 67 L. ed. 167 (1922)
Supra, p. 212.
72 -N.H-, 46 A. 2d' 538 (1946).
'-Iowa-, 23 N.W 2d 837 (1946)
"HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 187.
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sufficient to create an estate with survivorship, and that there-
fore there is a cloud on the widow's title.
The court expressly rejected the Stuehm case, saying that
"a division of authorities may be conceded, but, in our opimon,
the rules as laid down seem to be not only the modern, but
the logical rules in the construction of such deeds, even tho some
of the techical requirements for the creation of such estates, as
required at common-law, may be lacking in slich conveyances.74
In conclusion, it is believed by the writer that if the courts
would dispense with the *unities requirement for creation of
joint estates and estates by the entirety as being outmoded and
useless, the profession would be elevated in its own and the lay-
man's eyes, the present and future status of property titles
would be simplified, and much needless litigation avoided. It is
further earnestly believed the courts should scrupulously dis-
tinguish between joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety be-
cause of the different incidents of the two estates, and in order
not to create new forms of estates. Though the technical differ
ence between a joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety is
the difference between a holding by two persons as individual,
though joint owners, and a holding by two persons as a single
owner,7 6 yet the courts have not been consistent as to what
facts and language will create a joint tenancy where the
parties are husband and wife, and what will create a tenancy
by the entirety 77 The majority of states apparently allow the
intent of the parties, as expressed by the words of the deed,
to govern as to which estate 'is created.78 Where neither es-
tate is specified, the deed only providing that husband and
wife are to take, and providing for survivorship, irreconcili-
able conflict reigns.7 9 Kentucky appears to hold that a con-
=Switzer v. Pratt, -N.H.- 46 A. 2d 538 (1946).
,12 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) Sec. 430.
26 AM. JuR. 695-697, 712-714.
'Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ao F. 2d 14
(C. C. A. 9th 1927), Wilken v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68 (1895)
Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 34 N.E. 999 (1893) Saxon v
Saxon, 46 Misc. 402, 93 N.Y. Supp. 191 (1905) Van Ausdall v. Van
Ausdall, 48 R.I. 106, 135 Atl. 850 (1927).
"Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 109 Atl. 418 (1920), Peters v
Schachner, 312 Mo. 609, 280 S.W 424, 428 (1926) Van Ausdall v
Van Ausdall, 48 R.I. 106, 135 At. 850 (1927), Bennett v. Hutchins,
133 Tenn. 65, 179 S.W 629 (1915), 132 A. L. R. 630..
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veyance to husband and wife as jomt tenants with survivor-
ship creates a tenancy by the entirety rather than a joint
tenancy,8 0 thus following the common-law rules of construc-
tion.8 ' Only confusion can result from failure to make clear
the distinction between the two estates and the requirements
necessary for the existence of each, in view of their differing
Incidents.
Much can be said for the complete abolition from our prop-
erty law of estates by the entirety Already such estates are
not recognized in many jurisdicti6ns.8 2 Other courts have
shorn estates by the entirety of many of the incidents con-
stituting an integral part of such estates at common-law 83
Kentucky, for instance, has held that during the joint lives
of tenants by the entirety the expectancy of one, as sur-
vivor, is subject to execution. s  However, the creditors can
levy only on the debtor's expectancy, and if the debtor dies
before his spouse the creditors are left without further remedy
as to such property S5
Certain it is that the common-law concept of husband
and wife as an entity is no longer valid, neither as a part of
our law nor our mores. The Kentucky court has clearly in-
dicated that husband and wife are no longer the indivisible
unit they were before our Married Women's Act of 1894.80
" Laun v DePasqualte, 254 Ky 314, 71 S.W 2d 641 (1934).
BLACKSTONE (SHARSWOOD'S ED.) 181, see In re Brown, 60 F 2d
269 (W D. Ky., 1932), Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. 50, 99 N.E. 521
(1912) Dutcher v. Van Dume, 242 Mich. 477, 219 N.W 651 (1928),
Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 Atl. 81 (1907).
'Mittel v Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 24 N.E. 553 (1890), Fay v. Smiley,
201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W 369 (1926), Wales v. Coffin, 95 Mass. (13
Allen) 213 (1866) Robinson's Appeal, 88 Me. 17, 33 Atl. 652 (1895),
McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508 (1903)
Thornley v Thornley, 2 Ch. 229, 62 L. J. Ch. 370 (1893), cf.
CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1911) 378; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(3d ed. 1939) sec. 419; PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY,
PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Sept. 1944)
82.
, Sherrman v Weber, 113 N.S. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933) In
re Klatzl's Estate, 216 N.Y. 83, 110 N.E. 181 (1915), Barnett v.
Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W 2d 757 (1930).
&Hoffman v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W 2d 607 (1933).
' Ibzd; cf. Ky. CIviL CODE, sec. 490.
Smith v. Hughes, 292 Ky. 723, 167 S.W 2d 847 (1943), Smith v.
Butt & Hardin, 281 Ky 127, 135 S.W 2d 67 (1940) Coleman v. Cole-
man, 142 Ky. 36, 133 S.W 1003 (1911).
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The element of inseverability of estates by the entirety except
upon agreement of the parties, when viewed m connection
with the present day high incidence of marital separation
and divorce, indicates an undesirable restriction upon the
alienability of property
And it is doubted whether the public interest is served
by legal sanction of a form of tenancy under which one own-
er may not bring action against the other for waste or for an
accounting for rents-even after marital separation. 7 Tenancy
by the entirety is open to the further criticism that it offers
an obvious and foolproof avenue for avoiding creditors. A
bankrupt, for instance, may continue to enjoy the use and
income of property oned by the entireties with his spouse.88
The writer believes that the only reasonable course for
those courts which continue to recognize tenancy by the en-
tireties is to follow the route clearly pointed out by the recent
New Hampshire and Iowa opinions.
WLiAm E. FRANCIS
'Stimson v. Stimson, 346 Pa. 68, 29 A. 2d 679 (1943), Wake-
field v. Wakefield, 149 Pa. Super. 9, 25 A. 2d 841 (1942).
Cullom v. Kearns, 8 F 2d 437 (C.C.A. 4th, 1925) see Wilker-
son, Creditors Rights agamnst Tenants by the Entirety (1933) 11
TEr. L. REV. 139.
